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Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002) define flow as an individual’s deep engagement 
in an intrinsically rewarding activity.  McGonigal (2011) suggests that video games are 
flow elicitors.  If video games are flow elicitors, then spatial, agentic, and temporal 
perception required for game play may relate to flow in predictable manners.  Over two 
experiments, a simple video game with contextual (i.e., implied friction) and conceptual 
(i.e., ambiguous stimulus labeled either bullet-train or house) manipulations was used to 
elicit flow.  Effects of the manipulations were assessed trial-by-trial on two dimensions of 
flow (i.e., agency and temporal perception) and spatial planning, as well as an overall 
flow score.  Interesting relations emerged between the trial-by-trial agency variable and 
large-scale paper-pencil measure of flow as a result of being told the stimulus was a 
bullet-train.  These findings indicate that traditional perceptual measures of agency may 
be useful in future explorations of flow in the realm of gaming. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
 
 
According to Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002) flow is an individual’s deep 
engagement in any intrinsically rewarding activity.  The study of positive states such as 
flow has many practical applications and has been examined in many contexts, including 
artistic and athletic endeavors, complex learning, and work-related experiences (Bakker, 
2008; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).  Recently, 
video game researchers have also begun examining this state by designing games meant 
specifically to elicit positive outcomes through flow experiences (McGonigal, 2011).  
There is even a video game titled “flOw” inspired by this psychological phenomenon 
(Chen, 2007). 
Currently, there are a number of scales that examine the qualitative aspect of flow 
by administering questionnaires about the activity in which flow was experienced 
(Jackson & Marsh, 1996; Payne, Jackson, Noh, & Stine-Morrow, 2011).  Additionally, 
Dietrich (2004) reviewed neurological mechanisms associated with being in a flow state. 
Above and beyond these measures of flow, it may be possible to assess flow state 
via other variables that tap into the phenomenology associated with working toward a 
goal.  Examples of goal-oriented variables include the reported distance to and pitch of a 
hill (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), the perceived location of a continuously controlled and 
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moving stimulus (Jordan & Knoblich, 2004), the perceived location of a moving stimulus 
that implies different typical motions (Gill, Durtschi, Cutting, & Jordan, 2012; Reed & 
Vinson, 1996), judgments of agency while playing a game (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), 
and estimates of time after playing a game (Rau, Peng, & Yang, 2006).  Whereas these 
variables are not often cast in terms of flow, perception of space, agency, and time have 
unique relations to action planning and therefore control during goal achievement.  Thus, 
these variables may constitute components of the more complex phenomenology referred 
to as flow.   
McGonigal (2011) suggests that video games are essentially flow machines that 
allow us to achieve this happiness state much easier than other activities that might 
require much more time to master.  Yet, to capture the essence of a flow state while 
playing video games, researchers have heretofore been limited to behavioral indices, 
neurological evidence, or qualitative data.  Thus, the purpose of the proposed study is to 
examine if video games are sufficient to elicit flow, and if so whether or not there exists 
lawful relations between the phenomenology measured via traditional flow scales and the 
smaller-scale phenomenology assessed via measures such as perceived spatial location, 
sense of agency, and sense of time.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Flow 
As mentioned above, according to Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002) flow is 
an individual’s experience during deep engagement in an intrinsically rewarding activity.  
Simply, flow has been noted as the optimal state of being.  Nakamura and 
Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p. 89) stated “a good life is one that is characterized by complete 
absorption in what one does.”  Thus, analyzing this phenomenal state in the context of 
art, athletics, and other autotelic (i.e., intrinsically motivating) activities is logical given 
flow’s roots in positive psychology.  Further, McGonigal (2011) notes that flow can be a 
powerful factor influencing positive change in the real world.  For example, the game 
World Without Oil challenges players to adapt their gaming behavior to a world lacking 
in oil (McGonigal, 2011).  McGonigal’s claim that video games are flow elicitors 
suggests that when participants learn the dynamics of this game, aimed at teaching 
energy-conserving behaviors, gamers will inherently learn these socially beneficial skills 
and enjoy doing so, with the ultimate hope that such skills will transfer to real life energy 
saving behavior. 
Early work examining optimal states of being noted several reoccurring 
phenomena that contributed to achieving what was later known as flow (Nakamura & 
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Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).  Individuals who experienced this state had intense focus or 
concentration, a merging of action and awareness, and a loss of self-awareness.  
Additionally, they felt very much in control of their actions and had a sense that 
timepassed by differently than normal.  Further, the activity that was being performed 
was at or slightly above the skill level of the artists being examined (Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).  That is, the goals set were challenging but achievable.  Finally, 
feedback allowed those individuals to determine and, subsequently, enhance their 
performance.  These dimensions constitute flow state in goal-oriented activities. 
As mentioned previously, playing video games is also said to be a flow eliciting 
activity.  Unknowingly, the earliest game developers elicited flow in gamers, and 
recently, have been taught to use motivational and flow theories to achieve happiness 
outcomes (McGonigal. 2011).  McGonigal argues that games hold all the critical 
components necessary to facilitate flow.  Video games are complex and evolving systems 
that have multiple goals, multiple difficulty settings to satisfy multiple skill levels, and 
some point or status monitoring system that allows for performance regulation 
(McGonigal, 2011).  Additionally, there are generally no extrinsic rewards or motivations 
(e.g., cash or prizes) for playing video games, making such an activity autotelic.  Video 
games, then, can be thought of as intrinsically rewarding feedback machines.  As it 
relates to video games, flow can be viewed as an emergent state given particular 
contextual constraints during goal-oriented, intrinsically motivating activities. 
Whereas measures of flow state via questionnaires may be appropriate for some 
activities, experimental paradigms that measure phenomenal variables, trial-by trial, may 
be more appropriate for assessing flow state in a video game context.  For example, 
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during continuous control, one’s perception of space (Jordan & Knoblich, 2004), feelings 
of agency (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), and time (Rau et al., 2006) have all been examined 
in trial-by-trial and event-based contexts.  Given that these phenomenal variables are 
associated with working toward a goal, it is possible that they could be used as proxy 
variables for measuring flow, specifically within a video game context.   
Note that the point of this study is not to devalue survey data, as a questionnaire is 
used to assess flow state within the present study.  Rather, one of the main goals of this 
study is to assess the effectiveness of the aforementioned perceptual variables as proxies 
of flow state.  Although previous studies have performed sophisticated factor analyses for 
construct validity purposes (e.g., Payne et al., 2011), what is measured within 
questionnaires are proxies of the construct.  One important distinction within this study is 
that claims regarding the effects elicited are only for the scores reported, not necessarily 
the phenomenological flow experience of participants.    
Perception and Planning 
A possible theoretical account for why these goal-oriented variables are 
influenced by action-planning is the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001).  The Theory of Event Coding entails two major assertions. 
First, the Theory of Event Coding states that actions are planned in terms of their effects. 
Specifically, actions are planned in terms of the sensory consequences they will produce, 
not the movement dynamics by which the effects will be achieved.  For example, when 
planning to kick a ball, what is planned is to make the ball move, not the muscular 
dynamics through which the foot will make the ball move. The assertion that actions are 
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planned in terms of their consequences is relevant to video games because it indicates 
that while playing, gamers plan their actions in terms of what should happen on the 
screen (e.g., one race car should pass another), not what should happen with their fingers 
(e.g., one finger should hit a particular button while the thumb presses another).   
These assumptions of the Theory of Event Coding have been empirically 
validated by neuroscientists during the last several decades (Kawato, Furukawa, & 
Suzuki, 1987; Miall, 2003; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002).  For example, the 
second assumption of the Theory of Event Coding is that perception and action planning 
share overlapping neural resources (Hommel et al., 2001). That is, areas of the brain 
involved in planning actions (in terms of the effects that should occur) are also involved 
in perceiving.  The rostral portion of the ventral premotor cortex forms area F5 of the 
monkey brain (Rizzolatti et al., 2002).  Area F5ab contains canonical neurons that 
activate to objects that afford behavior (e.g., a piece of an apple is a graspable object).  
Area F5c contains mirror neurons that activate to observed behaviors (e.g., a monkey 
observes a different monkey grab a piece of an apple).  Thus, it could be reasoned that 
area F5, and specifically, mirror neurons are involved in both action-planning and 
perception as described in the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001).  The 
mirror neuron system that seems to be a small scale network lending itself to action and 
perception is part of a larger network contributing to higher level functioning (Iacoboni, 
2005). 
As a result, changes can occur in perception because of either changes in external 
events (e.g., the ball changes directions) or changes in planning (e.g., one decides to pass 
the ball rather than shoot it). The idea that perception and action planning share 
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overlapping neural resources is important to video games because it implies that what one 
perceives while playing the game is heavily influenced by the effects one is planning to 
produce at any given moment. If this is the case, then one’s experience of the game will 
likewise be continuously influenced by ones planning.  Given the influence planning 
states have on one’s immediate experiences while controlling an event such as in video 
game playing, it seems reasonable that experiences that occur during gameplay might be 
similar to those that occur during the goal-directed activities assessed by flow 
researchers.  
Perception during Action Control 
Spatial Perception.  A growing number of studies have supported the notion that 
perception is anticipatory (Jordan & Hunsinger, 2008; Jordan & Knoblich, 2004; 
Knoblich & Jordan, 2003).  That is, perception has been shown to act anticipatorily 
toward future goals rather than retrospectively (Jordan, 2008).  For example, individuals 
who continuously track a moving stimulus that suddenly vanishes, indicate a vanishing 
point further ahead from where the stimulus actually vanished in the direction of 
momentum (Hubbard, 1995).  Initially, researchers believed this forward displacement 
was due to a shift of the representation of the stimulus in the direction of momentum (i.e., 
representational momentum). Kerzel, Jordan, and Müsseler (2001), however, revealed 
that individuals who are not allowed to visually track the stimulus (i.e., they had to fixate 
on a cross in center of a computer screen) do not indicate forward displacement.  Based 
on these results, Kerzel and colleagues reasoned that the forward displacement found 
when tracking a stimulus is a result of oculomotor anticipation required when tracking 
the moving stimulus.   
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In support of anticipatory perception, Jordan and Knoblich (2004) used what 
could be considered a very simple video game.  The goal of the “game” was to move a 
dot back and forth across a computer screen using button presses.  Failure to do so 
resulted in a “game over” and required participants to repeat the trial.  The manipulated 
acceleration and deceleration of the stimulus was compared to driving a vehicle with 
either good or bad “brakes”.  That is, they manipulated the impact a button press had 
upon the acceleration and deceleration of the stimulus, such that in the high impact 
condition a button-press both accelerated and decelerated the stimulus more so than did a 
button-press in the low impact condition.   
This alteration in button impact was a manipulation of the effects 
(acceleration/deceleration) associated with particular actions (button-presses; i.e., action-
effect contingencies).  After either the second or third turn across the computer screen 
and when the stimulus was decelerated below a certain speed, the dot vanished.  
Individuals in the low impact condition indicated more forward displacement than did 
individuals in the high impact condition.  Larger forward displacement occurred due to 
the action-effect contingencies related to the effectiveness of the acceleration and 
deceleration in the low impact condition (i.e., a button press had less of an effect on 
stimulus acceleration and deceleration).  Alternatively, individuals in the high impact 
condition formed contingencies related to the effects of their actions, thus producing less 
forward displacement.  Importantly, the reason for the difference in perceived vanishing 
point across the low and high impact conditions resulted from the visual feedback 
associated with the actions that produced the corresponding visual outcome. 
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Video games, for example Mario Kart, employ a similar strategy by altering the 
impact that pressing a button has upon the acceleration of the racer.  It may be the case 
that players learn different action-effect contingencies associated with different video 
game characters that have different abilities.  Thus, it can be said that the effect that is 
produced by and coupled with an action influences action planning.  
Perceived Distance and Pitch.  As specified in the Theory of Event Coding, 
actions are planned in terms of the sensory effects commonly coded with those actions 
(Hommel et al., 2001).  In an extensive review, Proffitt (2006) investigated the influence 
of potential energy expenditure on visual perception (i.e., Economy of Action).  For 
example, Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) had participants make judgments about distances to 
targets and the steepness of a hill.  Interestingly, judgments made while wearing a heavy 
backpack made targets seem further away and steeper.  These data imply that action 
planning may integrate things like expected energy expenditure such that wearing a 
heavy backpack affects action plans concerning possible future goal-oriented activities. 
Similarly, Jordan and Knoblich (2004) showed that manipulations of control (i.e., 
the energy expenditure required to control a stimulus with low or high button press 
impact) affected perception of stimulus localizations.  Energy expenditure (i.e., the 
control necessary to accelerate and decelerate) affected where people saw the stimulus 
vanish.  Thus, manipulations of energy expenditure within the Jordan and Knoblich 
(2004) experiment affected anticipation, and therefore, perception. 
Although Jordan and Knoblich’s manipulation was physical in nature, implied 
variations in action-effect contingencies or energy expenditure can also effect 
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anticipation.  Hubbard (1995) proposed that implied forces, such as friction, can affect 
the perception of the vanishing point of a moving stimulus.  A test of this proposal had 
participants passively observe a stimulus move across a computer screen with no surface 
(no friction), a lower surface (medium friction), or between a lower and upper surface 
(high friction; Hubbard, 1995b).  Manipulations of implied friction (i.e., movement over 
varying conditions of friction) altered the perceived vanishing point, such that increases 
in friction led to decreases in forward displacement.   
Gill et al. (2012), however, demonstrated that forward displacement increased 
when the stimulus was actively controlled.  That is, the stimulus in Hubbard’s (1995b) 
experiment operated under inertial dynamics (i.e., the stimulus appeared to operate under 
the laws of physics), and the participants had no control of the movement (i.e., required 
no effort); whereas in Gill et al.’s (2012) experiment, the stimulus was controlled by 
either the participant or an experimenter, and the movements of the stimulus were 
intentional (i.e., the stimulus operated with goal-oriented intentional dynamics).  This 
reversal of Hubbard’s (1995b) findings may be the result of the inherent differences 
between the movement dynamics of the stimuli in both experiments.  It may be that 
intentional movement dynamics (i.e., a stimulus with non-inertial, goal-directed 
movements) are subject to economy of action perceptual planning processes associated 
with planned energy expenditure even when participants are not controlling the stimulus, 
whereas inertial dynamics are not. 
Taken from the Theory of Event Coding framework (Hommel et al., 2001), the 
action-effect contingencies corresponding to the planned actions associated with 
differential expected energy expenditure would certainly support the notion of different 
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action plans and, subsequently, different perceptual anticipations associated with those 
action plans.  Although Bhalla and Proffitt (1996) did not have participants walk to or up 
the hill, action plans related to the required effort affected the perceived pitch and 
distance to the hill.  Similarly, Gill et al. (2012) manipulated the level of implied friction 
within their experiment; however, there was no difference in the required actions 
necessary to move the stimulus across the screen.  Thus, perceptual differences in 
forward displacement between levels of implied friction were the result of different 
action plans. 
Whereas the previously mentioned literature shows that planning influences 
perception, it should be noted that the perceptual outcome can also influence the 
perception of space.  For example, previous literature in the realm of sports expertise has 
shown that performance influences things like the perceived size of a target.  That is, Witt 
and Dorsch (2009) showed that participants who kicked more successful field goals 
estimated the field goal uprights to be further apart and the crossbar of the uprights to be 
shorter in height.  Although their work suggested that the perceptual difference in 
perceived size resulted only after participants kicked the ball and not before, other 
literature suggests that only those experienced with such skilled activities will show 
activation of the motor areas of the brain (e.g., Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, 
Passingham, & Haggard, 2004). 
Concepts.  Previous literature (e.g., Reed & Vinson, 1996) has established that 
preconceived notions of the typical motion of an object can affect action planning and 
anticipatory perception of the object.  Reed and Vinson (1996) investigated the effects 
that pre-existing knowledge about an object’s typical motion had upon perception.  
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Participants were asked to indicate the vanishing point of an ambiguous stimulus that was 
labelled either a church or a rocket.  Typically, a church does not move in any direction; a 
rocket’s motion, however, is generally vertical (i.e., upward or downward).  Participants 
indicated significantly greater forward displacement when viewing the stimulus labeled a 
rocket compared to viewing the stimulus labeled a church, but only when there was an 
upward movement of the stimulus. 
To assess the influence of conceptual factors during stimulus control versus 
stimulus observation, Gill et al. (2012) had individuals either control or observe an 
ambiguous trapezoidal stimulus back and forth across a computer screen.  Participants 
were told they were controlling either a house or a bullet-train and did so on either a 
blank computer screen (i.e., no friction) in one block or with a black surface below (i.e., 
implied friction) in another block.  They found that individuals who controlled a bullet-
train were susceptible to the effects of implied friction, whereas those controlling a house 
were not.  That is, individuals who controlled a stimulus with a typical motion (i.e., 
bullet-train), were affected by implied friction and indicated greater forward 
displacement in the implied friction condition than in the no implied friction condition.  
Individuals who controlled the house, however, were not affected by implied friction as 
there was no forward displacement difference between the two contexts.  It may be that a 
concept effect was only robust for the bullet-train.  Thus, conceptual differences arose as 
a result of action planning in an implied effort scenario only for the object with a 
preconceived typical motion. 
How do contextual and conceptual variations relate to flow?  One basic function 
of many video games is the control of different characters and objects.  Many characters 
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within video games have different abilities such as strength, mobility, and longevity, 
which undoubtedly alter how gamers control them.   For example, in Mario Kart, players 
have the option to choose from many different characters whose acceleration, mobility, 
and speed all differ.  Additionally, many games differentiate difficulty between levels, 
such that one level has many more obstacles and challenges than another.   
According to the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001), video game 
players would learn a wide variety of action-effect contingencies.  Inherently, video 
games are full of complex contingencies, such that gamers must learn to operate within 
specific contexts within a dynamic system.  In Mario Kart, characters that have excellent 
turning ability but lower maximum speeds would produce different action-effect 
contingencies than characters that have poor turning abilities but higher maximum 
speeds.  Given that there are three laps in any given race in Mario Kart, players of the 
game would also learn the contextualized constraints associated with the particular course 
(and one might expect the third lap to be the best in terms of control and performance). 
Agency.  Metcalfe and Greene (2007) investigated how manipulations of the 
controls of a simple game affected judgments of agency.  For example, one manipulation 
utilized within Metcalfe and Greene’s experiment was the “hit” range of a catching box.  
Participants in this experiment played a computer game where they were asked to catch 
the Xs and avoid the Os that fell from the top to the bottom of a computer screen.  Then 
participants were asked to indicate how in control they felt on a horizontal sliding scale 
after each game (i.e., the participants had to pull the slider on the scale to indicate their 
level of control).  The previously mentioned hit-range manipulation widened the catching 
range such that if the catching box was within 10 pixels of the X, but not touching it, a 
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“hit” was still counted.  They found that agency increased as a result of the added 10 
pixel catching range compared to the control.  Additionally, when this additional 10 pixel 
catching range was added for the Os (that were to be avoided), judgments of agency were 
significantly lower than when the additional catching range was added to the Xs.   
Related to feeling in control, Mario Kart alters the control abilities of the 
characters within the game.  Thus, in order to effectively maneuver characters with poor 
control abilities, the player would need to alter their actions to attenuate for the poor 
control abilities of the racing character.  By doing so, the player is altering the effects 
their actions have upon the character and specifying necessary future actions to maintain 
that level of control.  When that player does learn the necessary contingencies to control a 
character with poor control abilities, they can feel very much in control of that character 
and possibly enter a flow state. 
Time.  In a study examining the perception of time, Rau et al. (2006) showed that 
experts of the game Diablo 2 underestimated the amount of time they played the game.  
They found that experienced Diablo 2 players indicated that less time had passed by than 
actually had, whereas novices overestimated the amount of time they played.  
Interestingly, a recent study by Buetti and Lleras (2012) showed that individuals viewing 
fear inducing stimuli experienced temporal distortion, such that they believed the image 
was present longer than it actually was.  When the participants believed they had control 
over the progression of the images, however, the distortion was attenuated.  Control may 
play a large role in temporal perception.  Thus, processes associated with action planning 
may modulate time perception.  
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Present Study 
The purpose of the present study was to assess McGonigal’s (2011) claim that 
video games elicit flow.  Another aim of this study was to examine the relation between 
flow scores (AFSS: Payne et al., 2011) and possible proxy variables of the 
phenomenological experience of flow (i.e., spatial, agentic, and temporal perception).  In 
this study, participants controlled an ambiguous stimulus labeled either a house or bullet-
train across two different surfaces of friction (i.e., no friction and implied friction), and 
indicated perceived vanishing points of the stimulus.  Additionally, participants were 
asked to give judgments of agency (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007) or estimates of time (Rau 
et al., 2006).  It is possible that asking participants to make indications of vanishing point, 
judgments of agency, and estimates of time in one experimental sitting could have 
detrimental effects on flow and confound results.  That is, if participants are pulled from 
the gaming context for too long, flow may not have been elicited.  Additionally, after 
each block of either no friction or implied friction, participants completed the AFSS to 
assess flow scores related to each implied friction context.  Thus, this study was 
comprised of two experiments to minimize the possible disruption of experiencing a flow 
state.  In both experiments participants indicated the vanishing point of a controlled 
stimulus.  In Experiment 1, participants made judgments of agency, whereas in 
Experiment 2, they made estimates of time.  Given the effects of context and concept 
upon spatial displacement, it was predicted that the aforementioned proxies would best 
relate to flow scores (as indicated by the AFSS) in contexts that afforded optimal control 
(i.e., no implied friction and bullet-train condition).
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine the relation between flow scores, 
agency (i.e., feelings of control), and spatial perception (i.e., spatial displacement).  Note 
that what was measured was reported feelings associated with the nine dimensions that 
comprise flow state.  These scores were aggregated and are believed to constitute the 
flow state.  An important distinction is that within this study, comparisons of scores are 
relative, and flow scores are statistically approached as continuous rather than claiming 
one may or may not be experiencing flow based on their aggregate flow score.  Thus, 
although participants reported on the dimensions of flow, it is possible that some 
participants may have experienced flow, some may not have experienced flow, and some 
may have experienced a stronger state of flow that others. 
Nakamura and Csikszentmihayli (2002) stated that individuals who experience a 
flow state report feeling very much in control of their actions (i.e., individuals feel a high 
sense of agency).  McGonigal (2011) reported that individuals who play video games can 
easily experience a state of flow.  As this experiment could be thought of as a simple 
video game, the predictions of Experiment 1 were based on past findings of context (Gill 
et al., 2012; Hubbard, 1995b), concept (Gill et al., 2012; Reed & Vinson, 1996), 
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judgments of agency (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007) and flow experience (Payne et al., 
2011).Predictions concerning flow scores were approached with reasonable assumptions.  
It was predicted that controlling a stimulus in a context with no friction would elicit 
highest flow scores.  The no friction context should elicit the greatest feelings of control 
and, subsequently, higher flow scores.  Additionally, controlling a bullet-train should lead 
to higher flow scores.  Controlling a stimulus that has a typical motion should lead 
individuals to feeling more in control of the object, subsequently lending to higher flow 
scores.  
As this experiment is the first of its kind concerning judgments of agency, 
predictions were based upon reasonable assumptions derived from previous agency 
studies (i.e., Metcalfe & Greene, 2007).  It was predicted that controlling a stimulus in a 
context with no friction would elicit higher judgments of agency.  Implied friction is an 
added constraint of controlling a stimulus.  Thus, in terms of control, one should not need 
to account for additional contextual constraints when there is no friction.  Additionally, it 
was predicted that controlling a bullet-train would elicit greater judgments of agency 
compared to controlling a house.  It may be the case that controlling a stimulus that has a 
typical motion allows participants to generate the action-effect contingencies for the 
stimulus with a typical motion better than controlling the stimulus without a typical 
motion.  Thus, controlling a stimulus with a preconceived typical motion should afford 
greater feelings of control to participants. 
Based on findings of past research, it was predicted the implied friction context 
should elicit greater forward displacement estimates than no friction (Gill et al., 2012).  
As previously described, this increase might be due to the economy of action effects 
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whereby the cost of an action affects action planning and subsequently spatial perception 
(Proffitt, 2006).  A concept effect was predicted to be present for the bullet-train 
condition, with participants indicating greater forward displacement in the implied 
friction condition than in the no friction condition (Gill et al., 2012).  Gill et al., (2012) 
found that controllers of the bullet-train indicated significantly greater forward 
displacement in the implied friction condition compared to the no friction condition.  
Alternatively, there was no difference in forward displacement for individuals controlling 
the house. 
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to assess McGonigal’s (2011) claim that 
video games can elicit flow.  Another aim of this study was to examine the usefulness of 
these small-scale perceptual variables as proxies of flow scores.  Concerning forward 
displacement, judgments of agency, and flow scores, hypotheses about the relations 
among these variables were consistent with the aforementioned predictions. These 
relations were predicted to be highly evident in the no implied friction and bullet-train 
conditions.   In order to gain insight into the usefulness of the small scale agency and 
time variables, the effects of the context and concept were assessed via the corresponding 
AFSS proxy variable (i.e., sense of control and transformation of time).  Predictions 
concerning the effect of context and concept on the corresponding AFSS proxy variables 
match those of the trial-by-trial variables.  That is, the effects should be strongest for 
participants told they are controlling the bullet-train in the no implied friction context.   
Forward displacement and judgments of agency should be positively correlated.  
As individuals learn to control a stimulus that they must also track, they simultaneously 
learn the effects associated with those actions.  Thus, as those action-effect contingencies 
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tighten, so too should the relation between forward displacement and judgments of 
agency.  Judgments of agency should be strongly positively correlated to flow.  If the 
relation between forward displacement and judgments of agency and the relation of 
judgments of agency and flow scores are as predicted, then forward displacement and 
flow scores should also be positively correlated.  Finally, the predictiveness of the 
agency, forward displacement, and time perception proxy variables onto flow scores 
should be evident when the bullet-train is controlled in the no friction context. 
Method 
Participants   
A total of 50 participants’ data were collected for Experiment 1.  Of the 50 
participants, one participant’s data were omitted due to computer error, one participant’s 
data were omitted due to believing there was deception involved in the experiment and 
erroneous behavior, and eight participants’ data were omitted due to either not 
understanding the experiment or because more than 35% of the trials were unusable.  
Thus, a total of 40 participants’ data were used in this experiment.  Participants were 
recruited from the Department of Psychology participant pool.  Each participant was 
informed of their rights as a research participant as required by the IRB.  Participants 
were debriefed, thanked, and also earned course credit for their participation. 
Apparatus 
Participants were seated at a chair, such that the position of the head was 
approximately 50 cm (19.65 in) away from the computer monitor.  Participants controlled 
a black trapezoidal stimulus (228 × 89 pixels) back and forth across the screen.  The 
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screen was either all white (no friction) or had a black lower half, such that the stimulus 
appeared as though it was on a surface (implied friction).  Figure 1.1 shows a 
representation of the stimulus and context conditions.  Participants were required to 
always start moving the stimulus to the right by pressing the B button on a Microsoft 
Sidewinder video game controller.  Each button press increased the velocity of the 
stimulus at a rate of .9°/sec2.  Participants were then required to decelerate and stop the 
stimulus in an area near the edge of the screen, indicated prior to the onset of the 
experiment, by pressing the X button.  Pressing the X button, while traveling to the right, 
decreased the velocity of the stimulus at a rate of .9°/sec2 per button press.  Participants 
then accelerated to the left by pressing the X button, and conversely decelerated by 
pressing the B button. 
The turning region was presented by hash marks for 2000 ms before the trials 
began.  The turning region was a boundary of 2.86° that began 0.5° from either edge of 
the screen.  These turning regions are restrictions of how participants played the game, 
and were implemented to control variability.  Participants were required to reach a 
minimum velocity of 7.77°/sec (five button presses) before decelerating during each pass 
across the screen.  After two or three passes across the screen, the stimulus vanished 
when the participant decelerated the stimulus lower than 7.77°/sec.  The number of 
passes before the stimulus vanished was preset and counterbalanced across conditions; 
however, because it was possible that trials were not usable and hence deleted from 
analyses, the number of passes could not be equally represented.  After the stimulus 
vanished and a 500 ms delay, the participants were required to use a crosshair controlled 
by the mouse and click where they perceived the stimulus to have vanished. 
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Trials that were considered unusable were those trials in which the actual 
vanishing point of the stimulus was within 30 pixels from either edge of the screen or 
within 50 pixels of the center of the screen.  For those trials when the stimulus was within 
30 pixels from the edge of the screen, a concern was that participants may have perceived 
that the stimulus was already off-screen.  For those trials when the stimulus was within 
50 pixels of the center of the screen, determining the direction of stimulus motion was 
problematic, thus those trials were deleted.  Finally, it was believed that either as a result 
of participant error or lack of attention, when participants indicated vanishing points 
greater than 100 pixels away from the actual vanishing point.  These trials were also 
deleted.   
Next, participants were required to provide a judgment of agency with the 
crosshair based on the question “How in control did you feel during this trial?”  A 
vertical line in the center on the computer screen (from top to bottom) was displayed with 
the words “Very much” at the top and to the left of the line, and the words “Very little” at 
the bottom and left of the line.  This scale is based on a previous measure (Metcalfe and 
Greene, 2007) that used a similar horizontal scale for participants to make judgments of 
agency.  A vertical scale was used in this experiment to reduce any effects associated 
with the horizontal vanishing point indications. 
Procedure 
This experiment lasted between 30-60 minutes.  Upon entering the lab, 
participants were informed of their rights as a participant and then signed informed 
consent.  Participants were then read the instructions of the experiment and randomly 
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assigned to one of two conceptual stimulus conditions (i.e., controlling a bullet-train vs. 
house).  After the instructions were read, participants sat at a desk approximately 50 cm 
in front of a computer monitor.  Participants used a Microsoft sidewinder gaming 
controller to control the stimulus.  Participants completed three successful practice trials 
before commencing the recorded experiment.  Context conditions were randomized such 
that half of the participants received the no friction condition first, whereas the other half 
received the implied friction context first.  The context in which practice trials were 
completed was consistent with the first experienced context in order to minimize 
confounding effects.  Participants were asked to complete 20 successful trials (one block) 
for each implied friction condition (i.e., a total of two blocks or 40 trials).  After each 
successful trial, participants were asked to indicate with the mouse where the center of 
mass of the stimulus (i.e., bullet-train or house) was when it vanished.  Additionally, 
participants were asked to indicate with the mouse how in control they felt.  A vertical 
line in the center of the computer screen was used as a reference for participants to 
indicate their level of control.  The indications from the lower half of the line meant the 
participant did not feel much in control, whereas indications from the top half of the 
screen meant the participant felt more in control.  After each successful block, 
participants completed the Activity Flow State Scale (Payne et al., 2011) as well as 
recorded an estimate of how much time they thought it took them to complete each block.  
Finally, after participants completed both blocks and questionnaires, they were debriefed, 
thanked, and given course credit for their participation. 
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Materials 
Activity Flow State Scale (AFSS).  After participants finished 20 successful 
trials (i.e., one block) they completed the Activity Flow State Scale (Payne et al., 2011), a 
26 item questionnaire assessing nine factors of flow state.  The factors that this 
questionnaire assessed are: merging of action and awareness; clear goals; concentration 
on task at hand; unambiguous feedback; challenge skill balance; transformation of time; 
sense of control (i.e., agency); loss of self-consciousness; autotelic experience. When in a 
flow state, participants should indicate higher scores related to the phenomenal 
experience related to each dimension.  Participants completed two AFSSs; one after each 
block.  The scores from the items of each sub factor were computed by averaging the 
scores from items corresponding to each dimension.  Finally, an overall flow state score 
was computed by taking the average of the items in the questionnaire.   
Cronbach’s α was computed for both contexts (i.e., no friction and implied 
friction).  Both the no friction context (Cronbach’s α = .72) and the implied friction 
context (Cronbach’s α  = .77) showed acceptable reliability (Cortina, 1993). 
Estimate of Time for each Block.  One item was included at the end of the 
AFSS that assessed the amount of time the participant thought it took to complete the 
block.  This question was necessary for Experiment 2 to examine time at different time 
scales (i.e., trial time  vs. block time ); however, it was included in both experiments to 
examine if thinking about time at a trial-by-trial basis influenced thinking about time at 
block level.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS: EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was a 2 (within-subjects: no friction vs. implied friction) X 2 
(between-subjects: bullet-train vs. house) X 2 (between-subjects: no implied friction first 
vs. implied friction first) mixed factorial design.  Whereas order of context had not 
previously affected forward displacement, the same assumption could not be made for 
flow, judgments of agency, or time.  Thus, order was included to assess any possible 
practice or psychological effects elicited from order.    
The dependent variables measured in Experiment 1 were flow scores, judgments 
of agency, forward displacement, and block time.  Both forward displacements and 
judgments of agency were measured after each trial, whereas flow scores and block time 
estimates were measured after each context (i.e., after no implied friction and implied 
friction).  Flow scores indicated on the AFSS were calculated after each block for each 
participant.  Questions that assess each flow dimension were averaged.  Finally, an 
average overall flow score was calculated. 
Forward displacement was calculated by subtracting the number of pixels 
between the perceived vanishing point and the actual vanishing point (i.e., the perceived 
vanishing point minus the actual vanishing point).  Positive values indicate displacements 
ahead of the actual vanishing point (i.e., forward displacement).  To assess temporal
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perception at each context level, estimated block times were subtracted from actual block 
time.   Thus, positive values or the amount in which participants underestimated block 
time indicated temporal contraction. 
Flow 
To assess the effects of context (no friction vs. implied friction), concept (bullet-
train vs. house), and order (no implied friction first vs. implied friction first) on flow 
scores, a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed measures ANOVA was performed.  There was a significant 
main effect of context on flow scores such that the no friction context (M = 3.64, SE = 
.07) elicited higher flow scores than the implied friction context (M = 3.27, SE = .13), 
F(1, 36) = 10.45, p = .003, ηp2 = .23, 95% CI [-0.60, -1.14]. 
There was also significant context by order interaction, F(1, 36) = 7.90, p = .008, 
ηp2 = .18.  Specifically, there was no difference between contexts when the no friction 
context was experienced first.  There was, however, a significant difference in flow 
scores between contexts when the implied friction context was experienced first such that 
there was a significant increase from the implied friction context (M = 3.07, SE = .19) to 
the no friction context (M = 3.76, SE = .11), F(1, 17) = 11.37, p = .004, ηp2 = .40, 95% CI 
[0.25, 1.07]. 
Finally, there was a significant context by concept by order interaction, F(1, 36) = 
7.05, p = .012, ηp2 = .16 (see Figure 1.2).  Post-hoc analyses revealed that when the no 
friction context was experienced first, there was a significant divide in the second block 
(i.e., in the implied friction context) of flow experienced between participants who 
controlled the bullet-train (M = 3.86, SE = .23) and participants who controlled the house 
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(M = 3.10, SE = .25), F(1, 20) = 5.84, p = .025, ηp2 = .23, 95% CI [0.10, 1.41].  Further, 
for participants who controlled the bullet-train, when the implied friction context was 
experienced first, there was a significant increase in feelings of flow from the implied 
friction context (M = 2.99, SE = .28) to the no friction context (M = 3.97, SE = .16), F(1, 
7) = 25.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .79, 95% CI [0.53, 1.43].  
Agency 
To assess the effects of context, concept, and order on agency, a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed 
measures ANOVA was utilized (see Figure 1.3).  There were no significant main effects; 
however, an interesting interaction effect was revealed such that for participants who 
controlled the bullet-train and experienced the implied friction context first, there was a 
significant increase in feelings of agency from the implied friction context (M = .65, SE = 
.02) to the no friction context (M = .70, SE = .02), F(1, 7) = 6.29, p = .041, ηp2 = .47, 95% 
CI [-0.10, -0.00].  
Forward Displacement 
To assess the effects of context, concept, and order on forward displacement, a 2 
× 2 × 2 mixed measures ANOVA was utilized.  As predicted, there was a significant main 
effect of context on forward displacement.  That is, forward displacement was 
significantly higher in the implied friction context (M = 29.11, SE = 3.52) than the no 
friction context (M = 18.66, SE = 4.18), F(1, 36) = 10.85, p = .002, ηp2 = .23, 95% CI 
[4.01, 16.88].  No other significant effects were found. 
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Block Time 
A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed measures ANOVA was utilized to assess the effects of context, 
concept, and order on block time.  There were no significant effects of the independent 
variables upon block time. 
Flow Dimensions: Agency and Time 
Based on preliminary Pearson Product Moment correlation analyses, it was 
determined that there was no correlation between the flow dimensions of sense of control 
(i.e., agency) and transformation of time.  Whereas theoretically, a mixed measures 
MANOVA would be appropriate to assess the effects of context, concept, and order upon 
the agency and time dimensions of flow, the data suggest that these two dimensions, at 
least within this sample, may not show the same pattern of results, thus a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed 
measures ANOVA was used to assess the influence of the independent variables on each 
of the two dimensions.  
There was a significant friction by order interaction effect on sense of control, 
F(1, 36) = 17.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .33.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that when the no 
friction context was experienced first, there was a significant increase in sense of control 
from the no friction context (M = 3.24, SE = .20) to the implied friction context (M = 
3.83, SE = .23), F(1, 20) = 9.79, p = .005, ηp2 = .33, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.19].  Further, when 
the implied friction context was experienced first, there was a significant increase in 
sense of control from the implied friction context (M = 2.99, SE = .25) to the no friction 
context (M = 3.86, SE = .22), F(1, 16) = 8.20, p = .01, ηp2 = .34, 95% CI [-1.51, -0.23]. It 
should be noted that the significant increase in sense of control from the implied friction 
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to no friction context only occurred for participants controlling the bullet-train and not 
the house.  That is, for participants controlling the bullet-train, when the no friction 
context was experienced first, there was a significant increase in sense of control from the 
no friction context (M = 3.33, SE = .35) to the implied friction context (M = 4.00, SE = 
.26), F(1, 11) = 6.40, p = .028, ηp2 = .37, 95% CI [-1.25, -0.09].  Additionally, for 
participants controlling the bullet-train who experienced the implied friction context first, 
there was a significant increase in sense of control from the implied friction context (M = 
2.63, SE = .38) to the no friction context (M = 3.81, SE = .33), F(1, 7) = 7.92, p = .026, 
ηp2 = .53, 95% CI [-2.19, -0.19]. 
There was a significant main effect of concept on the transformation of time flow 
dimension such that participants who controlled the bullet-train (M = 3.83, SE = .13) 
reported greater transformation of time than participants who controlled the house (M = 
3.38, SE = .13), F(1, 36) = 5.91, p = .02, ηp2 = .14, 95% CI [0.08, 0.83].  Additionally, 
there was a significant main effect of order on transformation of time such that 
participants indicated significantly higher transformation of time when they experienced 
the implied friction context first (M = 3.83, SE = .14) than when they experienced the no 
friction context first (M = 3.37, SE = .12), F(1, 36) = 6.07, p = .019, ηp2 = .14, 95% CI [-
0.83, -0.08].  Further, there was a significant three-way context by concept by order 
interaction effect on transformation of time, F(1, 36) = 7.71, p = .009, ηp2 = .18.  Post-hoc 
analyses revealed that when the no friction context was experienced first, in the second 
block (i.e., the implied friction context), participants who controlled the bullet-train (M = 
3.69, SE = .20) indicated significantly greater transformation of time than participants 
who controlled the house (M = 2.93, SE = .21), F(1, 20) = 6.58, p = .018, ηp2 = .25, 95% 
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CI [0.14, 1.38].  Finally, for participants who experienced the implied friction context 
first and controlled the bullet-train, there was a significant increase from the implied 
friction context (M = 3.75, SE = .25) to the no friction context (M = 4.33, SE = .24), F(1, 
7) = 6.78, p = .035, ηp2 = .49, 95% CI [-1.11, -0.05]. 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Analyses 
One of the main goals of this study was to assess if the small-scale measures of 
spatial, agentic, and temporal perception can be used as proxy variables of flow state. 
Thus, a Pearson Product Moment Correlation analysis was computed to examine all 
bivariate relations.  In order to comprehend fully the relation between flow and the small-
scale proxy variables, it was necessary to understand how space, agency, and time relate 
to each specific dimension of flow as well as the aggregate flow score after isolating 
context and concept (see Tables 1.1 – 1.4).  The following results discuss the relations 
between flow and the possible proxy variables via a Pearson Product Moment correlation 
after isolating variables by context, concept, and order (see Table 1.5).  Note that because 
variables were isolated, the degrees of freedom for the following results are small. 
The following results describe significant results for participants who experienced 
the no friction context first.  As can be seen in Table 1.5, for participants who controlled 
the bullet-train in the no friction context, significant correlations arose between flow and 
agency (r = .75, p = .005), flow and sense of control (r = .70, p = .011), and flow and 
block time (r = .71, p = .01).  Additionally, for participants who controlled the bullet-
train significant correlation between flow and sense of control (r = .62, p = .033) and 
flow and block time (r = .73, p = .007) remained in the second block (i.e., implied friction 
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context).  Finally, for participants who controlled the bullet-train there was a significant 
correlation between agency and sense of control in the implied friction context(r = .58, p 
= .046).  
There were only two significant correlations for participants who experienced the 
no friction context first and controlled the house.  There was a significant correlation 
between flow scores and sense of control (r = .88, p < .001) and agency and block time (r 
= .70, p = .025). 
Whereas there were eight significant correlations when participants experienced 
the no friction context first, when the friction context was experienced first there were 
only three significant correlations.  For participants who controlled the bullet-train in the 
implied friction context (i.e., first block), there were significant correlations between 
agency and forward displacement (r = .87, p = .005) and sense of control and block time 
(r = -.91, p < .001).  Finally, for participants who controlled the house in the no friction 
context (i.e., second block), there was a significant negative correlation between forward 
displacement and transformation of time (r = -.71, p = .02).  
Multi-level Modeling: Change in the Relation Between Flow and Proxy Variables 
In order to assess how the relation between flow scores and the predicted 
proxy variables changed by condition, multi-level modeling (HLM 7: Raudenbush, Bryk, 
Cheong, Congdon, & Du Toit, 2011) was used to show the change in flow score per unit 
increase in proxy variable (centered) score.  Proxy variables were centered and 
independent variables were dummy-coded. 
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Level 1: 
Ŷ (Flow) = β0j + β1ij (Context) + β2ij (Proxy) + β3ij (Context * 
Proxy) + rij 
Level 2: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(Order) + γ02*(Concept) + γ03(Order *Concept) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21(Order) + γ22*(Concept) + γ23(Order *Concept) + u2j 
β3j = γ30 + u3j  
 
 The following model was built such that the unique influence of context, concept, 
and order on flow scores could be assessed, but also the influence of the independent 
variables onto the relation between flow scores and each proxy variable.  The full multi-
level model can be found in Table 1.6.  As the main interest of this analysis is the change 
in the relation between flow scores and the proxy variable for each condition and to 
discuss the influence of the independent variables would be redundant, only change in 
flow score per one unit increase in each proxy variable will be discussed.  That is, the 
interest is the change in the relation between flow scores and each proxy variable as a 
result of the particular conditions that lead to significant changes. 
In examining the change in flow score per unit increase in agency score 
(centered), when the no friction context was experienced first, flow scores increased for 
participants controlling the bullet-train in both the no friction context (β = 1.55, SE = 
0.63, t(34) = 2.47, p = .019) and the implied friction context (β = 1.95, SE = 0.75, t(34) = 
2.61, p = .013).  Further, for participants who experienced the implied friction context 
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first, there was a marginally significant increase in flow scores when participants 
controlled the bullet-train in both the implied friction context (β = 4.60, SE = 2.41, t(34) 
= 1.91, p = .065) and the no friction context (β = 4.19, SE = 2.34, t(34) = 1.80, p = .082).  
Thus, regardless of the context and order of experiencing those contexts, there was a 
consistent positive increase in agency for participants who controlled the bullet-train.  
Alternatively, controlling the house did not result in a significant change in the relation 
between flow scores and agency scores.  The large coefficient in the implied friction first 
order is most likely a result of the distribution of data between the bullet-train and house.  
That is, the distribution of agency scores for participants controlling the bullet-train is 
negatively skewed with a few low scores.  Although these low scores could be considered 
outliers, they are completely within the realm of possible scores, thus these data points 
were not deleted.  This explanation is further validated by the large SE present when the 
implied friction context is experienced first.  Alternatively, the distribution of agency 
scores for participants controlling the house in the implied friction first order was not 
negatively skewed even with the few low scores.  Thus, a one unit increase in agency 
scores for the bullet-train was associated with and resulted in much high theoretical flow 
scores within the model.   
Next, the relation between flow scores and block time (centered) was examined in 
the same multi-level model using block time as the proxy variable.  Note that the low βs 
are a result of the unit of measurement for block time.  When the no friction context was 
experienced first, for participants who controlling the bullet-train, there was a significant 
increase in flow scores per one unit increase in block time  scores in both the no friction 
context (β = 0.00, SE = 0.00, t(34) = 2.86, p = .007) and the implied friction context (β = 
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0.00, SE = 0.00, t(34) = 2.44, p = .020).  No other conditions led to a significant change 
in the relation between flow and block time.  These results suggest that the change in 
flow score per unit increase in block time was the result of experiencing the no friction 
context first when controlling the bullet-train. 
Finally, forward displacement was examined as the proxy variable within the 
multi-level model.  No significant changes between flow scores and forward 
displacement occurred as a result of condition.
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION: EXPERIMENT 1 
Across all dependent variables except forward displacement, it was predicted that 
effects would be strongest for participants who controlled the bullet-train in the no 
friction context.  It was predicted that forward displacement would replicate findings 
from Gill et al. (2012).  These predictions were partially supported, but there was strong 
evidence that the concept played a central role across context and order.  Importantly, not 
until order was included did a conceptual effect exist.  When the no friction context was 
experienced first, in the second block (i.e., implied friction context) participants who 
controlled the bullet-train indicated significantly higher flow scores than participants who 
controlled the house. 
When the implied friction context was experienced first, flow scores for 
participants controlling the bullet-train increased significantly from the implied friction 
context to the no friction context.  Overall, these results suggest that order and context 
matter for determining flow scores for the bullet-train, but not the house.  It is possible 
that the increase in flow scores for participants controlling the bullet-train was a practice 
effect.  Alternatively, it is possible that when control constraints are lifted for an object 
with a typical motion (i.e., experiencing the implied friction context first while 
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controlling the bullet-train), feelings of flow increase.  Either way, a strikingly large 
effect size when controlling the bullet-train and experiencing the implied friction context 
first and similar results found from the trial-by-trial agency variable seems to support that 
the concept matters.  
Ultimately, these results partially confirm the hypotheses concerning the 
conditions that would elicit the highest flow scores.  The entirety of the experiment (i.e., 
the order in which contexts were experienced for each concept) proved very important in 
determining flow scores.  Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002) suggested that one’s 
current state is dependent on one’s previous state.  Thus, the notion that order had such a 
large influence is plausible.  Further, these findings become even more conceivable given 
the converging pattern in the analyses of agency. 
Although there were no significant main effects of context, concept, or order on 
agency, there was a trending context by order effect.   What was discovered was that 
when the implied friction context was experienced first, for participants controlling the 
bullet-train, there was a significant increase in agency scores from the implied friction to 
no friction context.  When the no friction context was experienced first, however, the 
pattern of results was not similar to those found with flow scores.  Whether this pattern of 
results is a practice effect or a result of lifting constraints, the concept mattered. 
There were no main effects of context, concept, or order on block time.  Overall, 
participants were extremely variable in their estimations regardless of context, concept, 
or order.  Thus, expectations concerning block time in Experiment 1 were not confirmed.   
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As predicted, context significantly affected forward displacement such that 
forward displacement was greater in the implied friction context compared to the no 
friction context.  No other effects were found.   These results partially support previous 
work showing that when a stimulus is controlled, implied friction results in increased 
forward displacement (Gill et al., 2012).  Moreover, these results reverse the implied 
friction effects found by Hubbard (1995b), when the stimulus is simply observed.  As 
previously suggested, the reversal is possibly due to the movement dynamics associated 
with the stimulus.  The prediction concerning a significant increase in forward 
displacement for those controlling the bullet-train in the no friction context compared to 
the implied friction context was not supported. 
The effects of context, concept, and order were assessed on the flow dimensions 
of agency (i.e., sense of control) and time  (i.e., transformation of time) to examine how 
well the trial by trial measures of agency and the block level measures of time  
corresponded.  An important aspect of the two aforementioned flow dimensions is that 
they were not correlated.  The lack of correlation between the two dimensions made it 
necessary to use two separate ANOVAs rather than a MANOVA.  Future studies 
examining the AFSS should assess the validity and reliability of these dimensions in their 
current form.   
First, there were no significant main effects of context, concept, or order on sense 
of control.  There was, however, a significant context by order effect such that regardless 
of order, there was a significant increase in sense of control from block one to block two.  
These results support the idea of a practice effect on sense of control.  Interestingly, this 
effect only occurred for participants who controlled the bullet-train.  That is sense of 
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control increased significantly from block one to block two only for participants who 
controlled the bullet-train.  In this case, concept rather than context was important in 
determining sense of control over the entirety of the experiment.  Further, these results do 
not support the notion that lifting control constraints increases sense of control. 
There was a significant main effect of concept on transformation of time such that 
participants who controlled the bullet-train indicated significantly greater time 
transformation than participants who controlled the house.  In addition, there was a 
significant main effect of order such that participants who experienced the implied 
friction context first indicated significantly greater transformation of time than 
participants who experienced the no friction context first.  Finally, there was a significant 
context by concept by order interaction.  If the no friction context was experienced first, 
there was a significant divergence in time transformation between participant who 
controlled the bullet-train and those who controlled the house.  That is, in the second 
block, participants who controlled the bullet-train indicated significantly greater time 
transformation compared to participants who controlled the house.  Further, for 
participants who controlled the bullet-train when the implied friction context was 
experienced first, there was a significant increase in time transformation from the implied 
friction context to the no friction context.  Once again, concept appears to be an 
important determining factor for transformation of time as indicated via the AFSS. 
Although there were interesting relations between flow scores and the proxy 
variables (as evident in the Pearson Product Moment analysis), the multi-level analysis 
demonstrated that controlling the bullet-train significantly increased the relation between 
both agency and block time and flow scores.  That is, for participants who controlled the 
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bullet-train, both agency and block time were significantly more predictive of flow 
scores.  Alternatively, neither context, nor concept, nor order altered the predictiveness of 
forward displacement (i.e., perception of space) onto flow scores. 
Overall, an interesting pattern arose within Experiment 1 that suggested that 
context, concept, and order play large roles in determining the phenomenal experiences 
associated with flow.  Specifically, the pre-specified typical motion of an ambiguous 
stimulus played a very large role in the phenomenal experience.  Experiment 2 was 
performed both to validate and expand the results of Experiment 1 with the hopes of 
providing a more thorough explanation of the phenomenal flow experience.
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
The same method utilized in Experiment 1 was utilized in Experiment 2, except 
that participants gave estimates of the amount of time that passed by during the 
successful attempt of each trial (i.e., not including any of the unsuccessful attempts at 
each trial in their estimate) by typing the number of seconds that each trial took instead of 
judgments of agency.  Often times, when participants learned the controls of the 
experiment, they experienced failed attempts at trials.  The estimate of time was 
concerned only with participants’ estimates of the successful attempt at a trial.  Asking 
for time estimates of only the successful trials was an attempt to minimize any bias 
resulting from multiple failed attempts. 
Nakamura and Csikszentmihayli (2002) found that individuals who report being 
in a flow state experience s of time, such that time seems to move faster than normal.  
Previous literature has demonstrated that gaming experts estimate less time having passed 
during a gaming session than novices (Rau et al., 2006).  Thus, Experiment 2 examined 
how manipulations of context (i.e., implied friction) and concepts (object with or without 
typical motion) affected time perception.
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Experiment 2 examined time with respect to manipulations of context (i.e., 
implied friction) and concepts (i.e., a bullet-train vs. a house).  After participants 
indicated the vanishing point of the stimulus, they were asked to indicate how many 
seconds had passed during the corresponding successful attempt of a trial by typing the 
number of seconds on the keyboard.  It was predicted that individuals in the no implied 
friction condition would indicate less time having passed than individuals in the implied 
friction condition.  Controlling a stimulus over the no implied friction context should 
afford maximal control and, subsequently, should be the context that elicits greater 
feelings of being in a flow state.  Additionally, it was predicted that individuals who 
controlled the bullet-train would indicate less time had passed than individuals who 
controlled the house.  Similarly, as the bullet-train concept should have elicited greater 
feelings of control due to typical motion, higher flow scores should follow.  Thus, the 
higher the flow score, the more temporal contraction should be apparent.  Predictions 
concerning forward displacement were the same as in Experiment 1.  Although the results 
of Experiment 1 did not confirm the initial hypothesis that participants who controlled the 
bullet-train would indicate greater forward displacement that participants who controlled 
the house in the implied friction context, the hypothesis remained consistent with 
previous findings from Gill et al. (2012). 
Sense of control and time transformation (i.e., the AFSS dimensions) were 
assessed for their correspondence to the trial-by-trial time  variable, the block time  
variable, and any patterns similar to the findings from Experiment 1.  It was predicted 
that the greatest effect would occur for participants controlling the bullet-train in the no 
friction condition. 
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It was predicted that time would relate negatively to forward displacement.  
Higher flow scores, and subsequently more time, should lead to greater forward 
displacement due to the predictiveness of action effects.  Additionally, time should relate 
to flow scores, and specifically to the dimension assessing time during the activity.  As 
trial-by-trial time increases, so too should the feeling of time transformation and flow 
scores.  Finally, if time and flow scores correlate, forward displacement and flow scores 
should also positively relate.  If greater forward displacement relates to the predictiveness 
action effects and performance, then larger displacement scores should be positively 
related to greater flow scores. 
Hypotheses concerning the predictiveness of the proxy variables were consistent 
with Experiment 1 such that the conditions eliciting the greatest predictiveness would be 
when participants controlled the bullet-train in the no friction context. 
Experiment 2 was also a 2 × 2 ×2 mixed design.  The dependent variables 
measured in Experiment 2 were flow scores, trial time, forward displacement, and block 
time.  Trial time was calculated by subtracting the estimated amount of time in seconds 
taken to complete a trial from the actual amount of time in seconds (i.e., actual time – 
perceived time).  Positive values indicate temporal contraction in the direction of 
predicted results. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the department of psychology participant pool.  
Each participant was informed of their rights as a research participant as required by the 
IRB.  Participants were debriefed, thanked, and also earned course credit for their 
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participation.  A total of 69 individuals participated in Experiment 2.  Of those 69, 11 
participants’ data were omitted due to experimenter error and 14 participants’ data were 
omitted because either the participant did not understand the instructions or had 
extremely variable data (trial time estimates greater than three standard deviations away 
from the mean).  Thus, in Experiment 2, a total of 44 participants’ data were analyzed. 
Materials 
Activity Flow State Scale (AFSS).  Cronbach’s α was computed for both 
contexts (i.e., no friction and implied friction).  Both the no friction context (Cronbach’s 
α = .79) and the implied friction context (Cronbach’s α = .71) showed acceptable 
reliability (Cortina, 1993).
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS: EXPERIMENT 2 
Flow 
To assess the effects of context, concept, and order on flow scores, a 2 × 2 × 2 
mixed measures ANOVA was utilized.  No significant main effects results from context, 
concept, or order.  There was, however, a significant context by order interaction, F(1, 
38) = 28.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .43.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that when participants 
experienced the no friction context first, there was a significant increase in flow scores 
from the no friction context (M = 3.39, SE = .11) to the implied friction context (M = 
3.61, SE = .12), F(1, 19) = 10.24, p = .005, ηp2 = .35, 95% CI [0.08, 0.36].  Further, when 
the implied friction context was experienced first, the same pattern arose such that there 
was a significant increase in flow scores from the implied friction context (M = 3.38, SE 
= .09) to the no friction context (M = 3.78, SE = .14), F(1, 19) = 18.16, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.49, 95% CI [0.21, 0.60].   
Additionally, there was a significant concept by order interaction, F(1, 38) = 5.04, 
p = .031, ηp2 = .12.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that when the implied friction context was 
experienced first, the participants who controlled the bullet-train (M = 3.58, SE = .12) 
indicated significantly higher flow scores than participants who controlled the house (M = 
3.18, SE = .14), F(1, 18) = 4.89, p = .04, ηp2 = .21, 95% CI [0.02, 0.79].
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Interestingly, participants who controlled the house indicated significantly larger flow 
scores regardless of order.  Specifically, when the no friction context was experienced 
first, there was a significant increase in flow scores from the no friction context (M = 
3.43, SE = .15) to the implied friction context (M = 3.75, SE = .19), F(1, 9) = 8.88, p = 
.015, ηp2 = .50, 95% CI [0.08, 0.56].  When the implied friction context was experienced 
first, there was also a significant increase in flow scores from the implied friction context 
(M = 3.18, SE = .14) to the no friction context (M = 3.74, SE = .24), F(1, 8) = 13.60, p = 
.006, ηp2 = .63, 95% CI [0.21, 0.93] (see Figure 2.1). 
Trial Time 
To assess the effects of context, concept, and order on time at each trial, a 2 × 2 × 
2 mixed measures ANOVA was utilized.  No significant effects resulted from this 
analysis and will be addressed further in the discussion. 
Forward Displacement 
To assess the effects of context, concept, and order on forward displacement, a 2 
× 2 × 2 mixed measures ANOVA was utilized.  There was a significant main effect of 
context on forward displacement such that participants in the no friction context (M = 
20.68, SE = 3.71) indicated significantly less displacement than when in the implied 
friction context (M = 33.91, SE = 3.64), F(1, 40) = 27.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .41, 95% CI 
[8.13, 18.34].  No significant main effects resulted from concept or order.  Interestingly, 
there was a significant concept by order interaction, F(1, 40) = 4.64, p = .037, ηp2 = .10.  
Post-hoc analyses revealed that for participants who controlled the house, forward 
displacement scores were significantly higher for those who experienced the no friction 
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context first (M = 39.52, SE = 5.64) than for those who experienced the implied friction 
context first (M = 19.14, SE = 5.64), F(1, 18) = 6.53, p = .020, ηp2 = .27, 95% CI [3.62, 
37.14].  There was no difference in forward displacement for participants who controlled 
the bullet-train in either order (p = .39). 
Block Time 
To assess the effects of context, concept, and order on block time , a 2 × 2 × 2 
mixed measures ANOVA was utilized.  Block time was calculated by subtracting the 
estimated block time from the actual block time.  There was a significant main effect of 
friction on block time, such that participants indicated significantly less  in the no friction 
context (M = -166.01, SE = 51.75) compared to the implied friction context (M = -0.77, 
SE = 39.29), F(1, 40) = 11.49, p = .002, ηp2 = .22, 95% CI [-266.20, -67.34].  No main 
effects resulted from concept or order.  Interestingly, there was a significant context by 
order interaction.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that participants who experienced the 
implied friction context first experienced significantly less block time  in the no friction 
context (M = -265.76, SE = 82.79) compared to the implied friction context (M = 14.89, 
SE = 54.22), F(1, 20) = 11.25, p = .003, ηp2 = .36, 95% CI [-455.25, -106.07].  There was 
no significant difference between contexts for participants who experienced the no 
friction context first. 
Flow Dimensions: Agency and Time 
Similar to Experiment 1, the flow dimensions of sense of control (i.e., agency) 
and transformation of time (i.e., time) showed no correlation, thus, the variables were 
analyzed separately.  To assess the effects of context, concept, and order on sense of 
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control, a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed measures ANOVA was used.  Alone, neither context, nor 
concept, nor order affected sense of control.  Interestingly, there was a significant context 
by order effect, F(1, 40) = 7.64, p = .009, ηp2 = .16.  That is, when the no friction context 
was experienced first, there was a significant increase from the no friction context (M = 
2.96, SE = .22) to the implied friction context (M = 3.41, SE = .23), F(1, 20) = 5.73, p = 
.027, ηp2 = .22, 95% CI [-0.83, -0.06].  A similar pattern arose when the implied friction 
context was experienced first.  That is, indications of sense of control increased 
significantly from the implied friction context (M = 2.70, SE = .24) to the no friction 
context (M = 3.58, SE = .25), F(1, 20) = 7.55, p = .012, ηp2 = .15, 95% CI [-1.53, -0.21].   
Next, a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed measures ANOVA was used to assess the effects of 
context, concept, and order on transformation of time (i.e., flow dimension of time).  
Neither context nor concept nor order significantly affected participants’ indications of 
transformation of time in Experiment 2. 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Analyses 
Once again, a Pearson Product Moment correlation analysis was performed to 
examine the relation between variables isolated by context and concept (see Tables 2.1- 
2.4).  To assess the relation between flow scores and the possible proxy variables, 
variables were isolated by context, concept, and order (see Table 2.5).  Note that because 
variables were isolated, the degrees of freedom for the following results are small.  The 
following discussion of correlations is based on Table 2.5 results. 
For participants who experienced the no friction context first, there was a positive 
significant correlation between flow scores and block time when controlling the house in 
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the no friction context (r= .67, p = .034) and the implied friction context (r = .72, p = 
.019).  There was a positive significant relation between flow scores and sense of control 
(i.e., flow dimension of agency) for participants controlling the bullet-train in both the no 
friction context (r = .67, p = .024) and the implied friction context (r = .71, p = .010).  
Further, for participants controlling the house in the implied friction context, the positive 
significant relation remained between flow scores and sense of control (r = .80, p = .006).  
There was a negative significant correlation between transformation of time and block 
time for participants controlling the bullet-train in the implied friction context (r = -.59, p 
= .045). 
Next, for participants experiencing the implied friction context first, there was a 
positive significant relation between flow scores and trial time for participants controlling 
the house in the no friction context (i.e., second block: r = .68, p = .03).  Additionally, for 
participants controlling the house in the no friction context, there was a negative 
significant relation between flow scores and forward displacement (r = -73, p = .016).  
Once again, for participants controlling the bullet-train there was a positive significant 
relation between flow scores and sense of control in both the implied friction context (r = 
.69, p = .012).  Similarly, for participants controlling the house in the no friction context, 
there was a positive significant relation between flow and sense of control (r = .88, p < 
.001).  There was a negative significant relation between forward displacement and 
transformation of time for participants controlling the bullet-train in the no friction 
context (r = -.68, p = .015).  Finally, for participants controlling the house in the no 
friction context, there were negative significant correlations between forward 
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displacement and sense of control (r = -.82, p = .004) and transformation of time and 
block time (r = -.93, p < .001). 
Multi-level Modeling: Change in the Relation Between Flow and Proxy Variables 
As in Experiment 1, multi-level modeling was used to assess the change in the 
relation between flow scores and the proxy variables by condition.  The proxy variables 
were centered and the independent variables were dummy coded.  Additionally, the focus 
of the following results is only of the change in flow score per one unit increase in proxy 
variable. 
As seen in Table 2.6, in the first model, trial time was the proxy variable.  
Interestingly, when the implied friction context was experienced first, for participants 
who controlled the house, there was a significant increase in the relation between flow 
scores and trial time in both the implied friction context (β = 0.03, SE = 0.01, t(36) = 
2.41, p = .021) and the no friction context (β = 0.04, SE = 0.01, t(36) = 3.13, p = .003).  
No other significant changes occurred between the relation of flow and trial time as a 
result of the different conditions.  These results suggest that the change in flow scores 
were a result of experiencing the implied friction context first when controlling the house. 
Next, block time was inserted as the proxy variable within the multi-level model.  
When the implied friction context was experienced first, for participants who controlled 
the house, there was a significant decrease in flow scores per unit increase in block time  
in both the implied friction context (β = -0.00, SE = 0.00, t(36) = -2.08, p = .045) and the 
no friction context (β = -0.00, SE = 0.00, t(36) = -2.95, p = .006).  Interestingly, there was 
a similar effect for participants who controlled the bullet-train.  That is, when the implied 
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friction context was experienced first, for participants who controlled the bullet-train, 
there was a marginally significant decrease in flow score in the implied friction context (β 
= -0.00, SE = 0.00, t(36) = -1.94, p = .060) and a significant decrease in the no friction 
context (β = -0.00, SE = 0.00, t(36) = -3.03, p = .005).  No other significant changes 
occurred between flow and block time as a result of the different conditions.  These 
results suggest that the decrease in flow score per one unit increase in block time may be 
the result of the order rather than context or concept. 
Finally, forward displacement was inserted as the proxy variable within the multi-
level model.  When the implied friction context was experienced first, for participants 
who controlled the house, there was a highly significant decrease in flow scores per unit 
increase in forward displacement in both the implied friction context (β = -0.02, SE = 
0.00, t(36) = -5.05, p < .001) and the no friction context (β = -0.02, SE = 0.00, t(36) = -
7.03, p < .001).  No other significant changes occurred between flow scores and forward 
displacement as a result of the different conditions.  These results suggest that the 
decrease in flow score per one unit increase in forward displacement was the result of 
experiencing the implied friction context first when controlling the house.
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION: EXPERIMENT 2 AND GENERAL 
In Experiment 2, like Experiment 1, it was predicted that the no friction context 
and controlling the bullet-train would lead to the highest flow scores (overall and within 
the agency and time dimensions) and the largest trial time and block time.  Further, it was 
predicted that forward displacement would replicate findings from Gill et al. (2012).  
Finally, these conditions were predicted to elicit the strongest correlations and lead to the 
strongest predictiveness between the proxy variables and flow scores. 
No main effects were observed on flow scores.  There was, however, a significant 
context by order effect.  Flow scores increased regardless of order.  Overall, when the 
implied friction context was experienced first, participants who controlled the bullet-train 
indicated significantly higher feelings of flow than participants who controlled the house.  
Interestingly, for participants who controlled the house, flow scores increased 
significantly across both orders.  These results suggest that concept and order play a role 
in affecting flow, but not in the predicted direction.  These results also suggest a the 
increase in flow scores may be the result of a general practice effect. 
Trial time was not affected by context, concept, or order.  This will be addressed 
later in the general discussion.
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As expected, context affected forward displacement such that as implied friction 
increased, so too did forward displacement.  There was a strange concept by order effect 
such that for participants who controlled the house, forward displacement was greater 
when the no friction context was experienced first.  This final result was not predicted.  
Overall, whereas the bullet-train produced significantly greater forward displacement 
than the house, it was the house that caused significant changes in forward displacement 
across orders.  Importantly, the main effect of context replicated the results from 
Experiment 1 and Gill et al. (2012). 
Context significantly affected block time.  The implied friction context elicited, 
on average, fairly accurate block time estimates.  Alternatively, the no friction context 
elicited large block time estimates.  No other main effects were found; however, there 
was a context by order effect.  Participants who experienced the implied friction context 
first, in the implied friction context participants, on average, indicated that less time 
passed.  In the no friction context, participants, on average, overestimated the amount of 
time that passed.  Although neither conditions’ estimates were significantly different 
from zero, it is clear that the implied friction context was trending toward real time 
contraction.  Whereas these results are alternative to the predictions, evidence of context 
affecting time is promising. 
Concerning the flow dimension of sense of control, there were no main effects.  
There was, however, a significant context by order effect such that regardless of order, 
sense of control increased from the first to second block, supporting the idea of a practice 
effect.  Time transformation was not affected by context, concept, or order.  This lack of 
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replication for both sense of control and time transformation to Experiment 1 will be 
addressed further in the general discussion. 
In general, neither context nor concept evinced strong correlations within the 
Pearson Product Moment analysis in Experiment 2.  In each order, the second block did 
evince more significant correlations supporting the idea of possible practice effects.  
Interestingly, the multi-level analysis confirmed the pattern of unexpected results.  Trial 
time was positively significantly predictive of flow scores only for participants 
controlling the house and who experienced the implied friction context first.  Block time 
was negatively significantly predictive of flow scores as a result of order rather than 
context of concept.  Finally, controlling the house and experiencing the implied friction 
context first caused forward displacement to be negatively significantly predictive of 
flow scores. 
Overall, Experiment 2 was not very supportive of the original predictions.  
Moreover, there were few replications of findings from Experiment 1.  Across both 
experiments, only forward displacement replicated.  Whereas in Experiment 1, flow 
scores were affected by context and concept as predicted, Experiment 2 showed 
somewhat alternative results.  In Experiment 1, there was some concordance in findings 
from the trial-by-trial agency scores and flow scores.  No such concurrence occurred in 
Experiment 2.  In Experiment 1, sense of control and time transformation also showed 
concordance with flow scores and agency.   In Experiment 2, only a practice effect was 
present in sense of control.  Although there was a significant effect of context on block 
time in Experiment 2, it was opposite of what was predicted and it was not in 
concordance with block time findings from Experiment 1.   Although there was little 
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concordance across experiments, the interesting patterns found in Experiment 1 are 
promising. 
In Experiment 1, similar patterns arose for flow scores, agency, and the flow 
dimensions of sense of control and transformation of time.  Although the predictions 
were only partially supportive, strong evidence that controlling the bullet-train and the no 
friction context evinced the highest scores was present. 
In Experiment 2, there was no clear pattern except that order played a large role in 
causing effects.  Further, there was no clear concordance between trial time and block 
time in Experiment 2.  As there were no effects on block time in Experiment 1, it is 
possible that the nature of the requested information altered the results.  First, participants 
in Experiment 2 were required to make one extra motion in typing their response into the 
keyboard rather than using the mouse as was required in Experiment 1.   This additional 
motion may have constituted a task-switch and confounded results. 
Second, in Experiment 2, participants were focused on estimating time throughout 
the experiment, whereas in Experiment 1, time estimates occurred only at the end of each 
block.  This could explain why there was no concordance concerning flow scores and the 
flow dimensions across experiments.  The relative accuracy of block time estimates 
witnessed in Experiment 2 may be a tradeoff between the processing necessary to track 
time and the dynamic resources required for the flow experience. That is, the nature of 
the trial-by-trial time estimate question may have used the cognitive resources that are 
not conducive to the flow experience.  Asking participants to make a value judgment 
concerning control after each trial may not require the same cognitive resources and thus 
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affect the phenomenal flow experience differently than asking participants to estimate 
time.  For example, Droit-Volet and Meck (2007) suggested that if attentional resources 
are devoted to temporal perception, time contraction may not occur.  Small nuances in an 
experience may significantly alter the phenomenological aspects of that experience.
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this study was to assess claims made by McGonigal (2011) that 
video games are flow elicitors.  Through the use of a simple video game it was found that 
under certain circumstances flow can be altered via manipulations of context and 
concept.  A second goal of this study was to assess the usefulness of previously studied 
perceptual variables (e.g., agency, time, and space) as proxies of flow scores.  What was 
found was that one’s sense of agency is a promising indicator of being in a flow state.  
Alternatively, one’s perception of time and space may not be promising indicators, at 
least as assessed within this study. 
Although there were conflicting results across experiments, the fundamental 
difference in the tasks, specifically asking one to reflect about control rather than time, 
may account for the lack of concordance. 
Perhaps the greatest take away from Experiment 1 was that concept matters.  
Specifically, being told that the stimulus being controlled is one that has a typical motion 
seemed to play a very large role in causing differences in flow scores and possibly the 
phenomenological differences in feelings of flow.  This notion was supported by the 
results from the multi-level model analysis that showed that controlling the bullet-train 
increased the predictiveness of agency to flow scores.
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The findings from Experiment 1 also support previously mentioned theoretical 
account The Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001).  As predicted, implied 
friction increased forward displacement showing that effects associated with actions 
affect visual perception or planning.  Further, the significant increases in flow scores and 
agency from the implied to no friction context for participants who controlled the bullet-
train but not the house implies that the planning or the effects associated with actions for 
the object with a typical motion may have had a phenomenological effect.  That is, the 
effects one expected from a bullet-train was tied into the complexity of agency and flow 
scores. 
The greatest take away from Experiment 2 is that the way in which one 
experiences an activity may play a large role in the phenomenological aspects of flow.  
Not only were predictions not supported, at times, they were actually opposite of what 
was expected.  It is possible that asking one about time is not conducive to achieving 
flow.  Future studies might eliminate the notion that a task switch confounded results by 
having participants type a value of how in control they feel after each trial.  If the results 
replicate Experiment 1 from this study, the probability that a task switch was a 
confounding factor is low. 
This lack of concordance between Experiments 1 and 2 concerning flow scores 
might raise questions about the rather supportive findings of Experiment 1.  As 
mentioned, however, the way in which one experiences an activity may change the 
phenomenological aspects associated with that activity.  Thus, although the only 
difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was one question and the hand movements 
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required to answer, that small difference seems to alter the flow experience in a very 
significant way. 
One possible explanation as to why calling a stimulus a bullet-train mattered is 
that it allowed for better immersion into the task.  For participants who were told that 
they were accelerating and decelerating a bullet-train, the typical motion associated with 
the train and relevance to the task may have allowed participants to be more fully 
engrossed or immersed with the task.  That is, if labeling a stimulus as a task relevant 
concept aids in immersion, a necessary component of flow, then labeling the stimulus a 
bullet-train that accelerates and decelerates across a horizontal plane may have aided in 
the immersion above what labeling the stimulus as a house did.  Immersion is an 
important aspect of the visual experience and can alter things like distance perception 
(Mohler, Bültoff, Thompson, & Creem-Regehr, 2008). 
In addition to the importance of concept in flow scores, it was also shown that 
both context and order mattered in this study. One point to be emphasized is that context, 
or presence of implied friction, was a psychological construct.  That is, compared to other 
experiments in which control manipulations had physical implications on the actions 
produced by participants (e.g., Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), context in this study was a 
visual addition with action implications.  What was manipulated, then, was anticipation 
or action-effects such that participants anticipated that different effects would result from 
their actions based on context. 
One important factor that was overlooked during the development of this study 
was the importance of the entire experience across both the no friction and implied 
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friction contexts.  Once order was considered as a possible important variable, what was 
found were effects supportive of predictions, at least in Experiment 1.  As previously 
mentioned, Csikszentmihayli (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002) suggested that one’s 
state is affected by one’s previous state.  Csikszentmihayli’s suggestion indicates that 
past experiences have real influences of current actions.  In this light, that order played 
such a large role is not surprising. 
There are many directions that future studies on this topic might focus on.  First, 
as previously mentioned, understanding if the additional movement or type of question 
asked in Experiment 2 confounded results is extremely important.  Next, approaching this 
problem with a dynamical view might allow for a better understanding of the flow 
process via proxy variables over time.  That is, the current study examined proxy 
variables using average scores whereas a better approach to understanding the complexity 
of flow state and related variables may be to analyze results over time.  Within this 
approach, one might assess button-press data that might reveal differences in variability.  
Further, one might look at variability in terms of the actual vanishing point, the perceived 
vanishing point, and forward displacement.  Such an endeavor might reveal interesting 
visual and behavioral dynamics associated with the phenomenological flow experience. 
Forward displacement showed little to no predictiveness towards flow scores.  
One possible reason for this result is that there was no feedback regarding this outcome 
variable.  That is, within the experiment, visual feedback came from both the effects of a 
button-press and after a failed trial occurred.  A future study might attempt to provide 
feedback regarding the difference between the perceived and actual vanishing point.  
Forward displacement feedback may only not only for a better established relation 
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between spatial perception and flow, but might also reveal additional information about 
the effects of context on the perceived vanishing point. 
Another direction future studies should examine is previous gaming experience.  
This study did not analyze past gaming experience as a possible factor influencing the 
phenomenological aspect of flow.  One possible reason for the order effects seen is that 
individuals with more experience may have been misrepresented in one order vs. the 
other.  This may have led to either an increase or decrease in scores for that particular 
condition.  Note that no participants had taken part in that experiment prior to their 
session, so although there may have been variability in gaming experience across 
conditions, everyone was a novice to the experimental task in this study. 
Ultimately, what was found is that flow scores can indeed be influenced by the 
components that constitute video games (i.e., context and concept).  Thus, McGonigal’s 
(2011) claim was supported.  Further, it was found that agency is a promising perceptual 
proxy of flow scores.  The perception of time and space, however, may not be very 
promising proxies.  Future work should further probe the perception of agency and its 
predictiveness of flow scores to understand how it might be used not only by video game 
designers, but possibly by researchers trying to increase one’s ability to enter into the 
optimal state of being.
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 FIGURES 
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Figure 1.1. Representation of contexts and stimulus. 
  
67 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Experiment 1 three-way interaction of context, concept, and order on flow 
scores. 
  
68 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Experiment 1 marginally significant interaction revealing significant increase 
in agency from the implied friction to no friction context for participants who 
experienced the implied friction context first and who controlled the bullet-train.  Note 
that standard error bars represent error from entire three way interaction, thus do not 
appear significantly different.
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EXPERIMENT 1 CORRELATION MATRICES AND 
 MULTI-LEVEL MODEL TABLE 
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Table 1.5 
Correlations among flow scores, proxy variables, and flow dimensions by condition 
Correlation variables 
No Friction First Implied Friction First 
No Friction Implied Friction Implied Friction Implied Friction 
BT H BT H BT H BT H 
Flow & Agency .75** -.03 .43 .16 .11 .14 .17 -.20 
Flow & CN .70* .88** .62* .21 .40 .43 -.60 .31 
Flow & FD .18 -.09 .30 -.04 .24 .08 .32 -.36 
Flow & BTC .71* .15 .73** -.19 -.37 -.14 -.14 -.18 
Flow & TT .03 .60 .39 .15 -.11 .19 .41 .58 
Agency & CN .43 -.11 .58* -.06 .59 -.38 .50 .60 
Agency & FD .29 .35 .10 -.20 .87** .54 .39 .35 
Agency & BTC .31 .53 .16 .70* -.31 .26 .07 .26 
Agency & TT -.13 .26 -.24 .34 -.11 .56 .12 -.41 
FD & CN .05 -.01 -.03 -.32 .39 -.19 .19 .36 
FD & BTC .28 .41 .19 -.03 -.16 .38 -.59 .54 
FD & TT -.01 .36 -.25 .05 -.16 .25 -.28 -.71* 
CN & BTC .34 .40 .25 -.09 -.91** -.20 .23 .60 
CN & TT -.24 .47 .09 .50 .15 -.30 -.59 -.16 
TT & BTC .31 .11 .29 .42 -.04 -.39 .18 -.42 
Note. Asterisks denote significance, ** p < .01, * p < .05.  IVs: BT = Bullet-train, H = House; DVs: CN = Sense of control, FD = 
Forward Displacement, BTC = Block time, TT = Transformation of time. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 FIGURE
78 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Experiment 2 two-way interaction of concept and order on flow scores. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 CORRELATION MATRICES AND 
 MULTI-LEVEL MODEL TABLE 
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Table 2.5 
Correlations among flow scores, proxy variables, and flow dimensions by condition  
Correlation 
variables 
No Friction First Implied Friction First 
No Friction Implied Friction Implied Friction No Friction 
BT H BT H BT H BT H 
Flow & TTC -.23 -.03 -.30 .46 -.46 .52 -.03 .68* 
Flow & TT .21 .40 .39 .33 -.29 .22 .16 .27 
Flow & BTC -.18 .67* -.44 .72* -.19 .45 -.39 -.14 
Flow & FD -.33 -.24 -.33 -.49 .17 -.43 .17 -.73* 
Flow & CN .67* .37 .71* .80** .75** -.22 .69* .88** 
TTC & TT -.52 -.38 -.54 -.41 .54 .56 .12 .42 
TTC & BTC -.17 -.14 .44 .55 .08 .48 .23 -.43 
TTC & FD .29 -.43 .24 .07 .09 -.29 .17 -.59 
TTC & CN -.20 -.09 -.38 .40 -.43 -.31 .21 .50 
FD & TT -.35 -.37 -.08 -.48 -.45 -.13 -.68* -.01 
FD & BTC -.15 -.09 .21 -.31 -.01 -.19 .14 -.15 
FD & CN .07 .16 -.58 -.34 .40 -.52 .47 -.82** 
TT & BTC -.27 .17 -.59* .30 .33 .40 .23 -.93** 
TT & CN .06 -.51 .32 .06 -.51 -.51 -.30 .02 
BTC & CN .13 .37 -.50 .57 -.36 -.17 -.38 .11 
Note. Asterisks denote significance, ** p < .01, * p < .05.  IVs: BT = Bullet-train, H = House; DVs: TTC = Trial Time, BTC = 
Block time, TT = Transformation of time, FD = Forward Displacement, CN = Sense of control. 
85 
 
T
ab
le
 2
.6
  
M
u
lt
il
ev
el
 a
n
a
ly
se
s 
o
f 
re
la
ti
o
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 f
lo
w
 a
n
d
 p
ro
xy
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
b
y 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 
 
 
N
o
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 F
ir
st
 
Im
p
li
ed
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 F
ir
st
 
 
 
N
o
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
Im
p
li
ed
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
Im
p
li
ed
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
N
o
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
F
ix
ed
 C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
F
lo
w
 I
n
te
rc
ep
t 
 (
 β
0
j)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
 
γ 0
0
 
3
.4
4
*
*
*
 
3
.5
5
*
*
*
 
3
.3
2
*
*
*
 
3
.4
2
*
*
*
 
3
.6
5
*
*
*
 
3
.5
4
*
*
*
 
3
.7
7
*
*
*
 
3
.6
6
*
*
*
 
O
rd
er
 
γ 0
1
 
0
.1
1
 
-0
.1
1
 
0
.1
1
 
-0
.1
1
 
-0
.1
1
 
0
.1
1
 
-0
.1
1
 
0
.1
1
 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ 0
2
 
0
.3
4
†
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.3
4
†
 
0
.1
2
 
-0
.3
4
†
 
-0
.1
2
 
-0
.3
4
†
 
-0
.1
2
 
O
rd
er
 *
 C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ 0
3
 
-0
.2
2
 
0
.2
2
 
-0
.2
2
 
0
.2
2
 
0
.2
2
 
-0
.2
2
 
0
.2
2
 
-0
.2
2
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
S
lo
p
e 
( 
Β
1
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ 1
0
 
-0
.1
2
 
-0
.1
2
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.1
2
 
-0
.1
2
 
-0
.1
2
 
T
T
C
 S
lo
p
e 
( 
β
2
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ  
2
0
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
3
*
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
4
*
*
 
O
rd
er
 
γ  
2
1
 
0
.0
8
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.0
8
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.0
4
*
*
 
-0
.0
4
*
*
 
0
.0
4
*
*
 
-0
.0
4
*
*
 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ  
2
2
 
0
.0
1
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.0
1
 
-0
.0
3
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
3
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
3
 
O
rd
er
 *
 C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ  
2
3
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.0
4
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
4
 
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
4
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
*
 T
T
C
 S
lo
p
e 
( 
 β
 3
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ  
3
0
 
-0
.0
1
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
1
 
-0
.0
1
 
-0
.0
1
 
F
lo
w
 I
n
te
rc
ep
t 
( 
β
0
j)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ 0
0
 
3
.3
9
*
*
*
 
3
.5
9
 
3
.3
9
*
*
*
 
3
.5
9
*
*
*
 
3
.6
9
*
*
*
 
3
.4
3
*
*
*
 
3
.6
9
*
*
*
 
3
.4
3
*
*
*
 
O
rd
er
 
γ 0
1
 
0
.2
0
 
-0
.2
0
 
0
.2
0
 
-0
.2
0
 
-0
.2
6
 
0
.2
6
 
-0
.2
6
 
0
.2
6
 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ 0
2
 
0
.3
0
 
-0
.1
6
 
0
.3
0
 
-0
.1
6
 
-0
.3
0
 
0
.1
6
 
-0
.3
0
 
0
.1
6
 
O
rd
er
 *
 C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ 0
3
 
-0
.4
6
 
0
.4
6
 
-0
.4
6
 
0
.4
6
 
0
.4
6
 
-0
.4
6
 
0
.4
6
 
-0
.4
6
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
S
lo
p
e 
( 
Β
1
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ 1
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
B
T
C
 S
lo
p
e 
( 
β
2
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ  
2
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
†
 
-0
.0
0
*
 
-0
.0
0
*
*
 
-0
.0
0
*
*
 
O
rd
er
 
γ  
2
1
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ  
2
2
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
*
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
*
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
*
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
*
 
O
rd
er
 *
 C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ  
2
3
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
N
o
te
. 
 †
 p
 <
 .
1
0
, 
*
 p
 <
 .
0
5
, 
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
1
, 
*
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
0
1
. 
 T
T
C
 =
 T
ri
al
 t
im
e;
 B
T
C
 =
 B
lo
ck
 t
im
e;
 F
D
 =
 F
o
rw
ar
d
 d
is
p
la
ce
m
en
t.
  
T
ab
le
 2
.6
 c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
 o
n
 n
ex
t 
p
ag
e
 
 
86 
 
 
T
ab
le
 2
.6
 C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
 
M
u
lt
il
ev
el
 a
n
a
ly
se
s 
o
f 
re
la
ti
o
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 f
lo
w
 a
n
d
 p
ro
xy
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
b
y 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 
 
 
N
o
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 F
ir
st
 
Im
p
li
ed
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 F
ir
st
 
 
 
N
o
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
Im
p
li
ed
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
N
o
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
Im
p
li
ed
 F
ri
ct
io
n
 
F
ix
ed
 C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
B
u
ll
et
-t
ra
in
 
H
o
u
se
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
*
 B
T
C
 S
lo
p
e 
( 
 β
3
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ  
3
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
F
lo
w
 I
n
te
rc
ep
t 
( 
β
0
j)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ 0
0
 
3
.3
8
*
*
*
 
3
.6
9
*
*
*
 
3
.3
6
*
*
*
 
3
.6
7
*
*
*
 
3
.6
8
*
*
*
 
3
.3
2
*
*
*
 
3
.7
1
*
*
*
 
3
.3
4
*
*
*
 
O
rd
er
 
γ 0
1
 
0
.3
1
 
-0
.3
1
 
0
.3
1
 
-0
.3
1
 
-0
.3
6
*
 
0
.3
6
*
 
-0
.3
6
*
 
0
.3
6
*
 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ 0
2
 
0
.3
2
†
 
-0
.3
5
†
 
0
.3
2
†
 
-0
.3
5
†
 
-0
.3
2
†
 
0
.3
5
†
 
-0
.3
2
†
 
0
.3
5
†
 
O
rd
er
 *
 C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ 0
3
 
-0
.6
7
*
 
0
.6
7
*
 
-0
.6
7
*
 
0
.6
7
*
 
0
.6
7
*
 
-0
.6
7
*
 
0
.6
7
*
 
-0
.6
7
*
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
S
lo
p
e 
( 
Β
1
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ 1
0
 
-0
.0
2
 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.0
2
 
-0
.0
2
 
-0
.0
2
 
F
D
 S
lo
p
e 
( 
β
2
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ  
2
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
*
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
*
 
O
rd
er
 
γ  
2
1
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
*
 
0
.0
2
*
*
*
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
*
 
0
.0
2
*
*
*
 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ  
2
2
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
2
*
*
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
2
*
*
 
O
rd
er
 *
 C
o
n
ce
p
t 
γ  
2
3
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
 
0
.0
2
*
*
 
-0
.0
2
*
 
0
.0
2
*
*
 
0
.0
2
*
*
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
 
0
.0
2
*
*
 
-0
.0
2
*
*
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
*
 F
D
 S
lo
p
e 
( 
 β
3
ij
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
γ  
3
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
N
o
te
. 
 †
 p
 <
 .
1
0
, 
*
 p
 <
 .
0
5
, 
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
1
, 
*
*
*
 p
 <
 .
0
0
1
. 
 T
T
C
 =
 T
ri
al
 t
im
e;
 B
T
C
 =
 B
lo
ck
 t
im
e;
 F
D
 =
 F
o
rw
ar
d
 d
is
p
la
ce
m
en
t.
 
 
